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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
KARNA HELD,
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vs.

Case No. 8513

AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY
COMPANY, a corporation,
Appellant.

Appeal from the Third J udicia1 District Court,
In and for Salt Lake :County, State of Utah
Honorable Martin M. Larson, District Judge
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
IN'TRODUC.TION
This cause is before this Honorable Court pursuant to its Order (R. 23) dated April 25, 1956,
granting appellant's (defendant below) Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal (R. 25-36) from the Order
of the District Court (R. 21) denying appellant's
Motion to Dismiss (R. 18). (The citation "R." followed by a number refers to pages of the Record
on Appeal).
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STATEMENT OF FAC·TS
Respondent (plaintiff below), a former employee of the appellant, brought this action in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, alleging that appellant had discharged
her in breach of contract, an'd seeking damages in
the amount of $31,900.00 for that breach (R. 1-3).
Specifically respondent alleged:
'fhat on the 2nd day of December, 1954,
defendant discharged plaintiff and terminated
her employment relationship. That said discharge was without good and sufficient cause
and was in violation of the terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement
between defendant and the Amalgamated
(sic) Clothing Workers of America, local
union No. 562. (Paragraph IV of Complaint,
R. 2, emphasis added).
Respondent had been employed by appellant for
several years as a press operator. She was a member
of the Amalgamated 'Clothing Workers of America,
Local Union No. 562, ( R. 1, 4), which union had
entered into a written collective bargaining agreement with appellant covering certain terms and
conditions of employment for certain job classifications at appellant's Salt Lake City plant, including
the job classification in which respondent was employed ( R. 44-48) . A copy of that collective bargaining agreement is printed beginning at page 20 of
2
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the Appendix to this brief for the convenience of
the Court.
It is undisputed that at the time of her discharge by appellant on or about December 2, 1954
said collective bargaining agreement was in full
force and effect, and that respondent's job-classification was covered thereby (R. 11).
Respondent protested her discharge, and the
union, on her behalf and with her knowledge, consent, and participation, submitted the grievance to
arbitration before William H. Leary, agreed upon
by the union and appellant as sole arbitrator, upon
the following issue, to-wit:
Was the discharge of Karna Held on
Decem'ber 2nd, 1954, by the Company in violation of Article III of the contract between the
parties? ( R. 50) .
Article III of the contract reads as follows:
ARTICLE III
DISCRIMINATION
The Company agrees not to suspend, discipline, discharge or discriminate against any
employee for lawful union activities. (R. 44,
Appendix p. 21).
The arbitrator, after hearing testimony adduced by both the appellant and the union, made his
written decision on April 4, 1955 in which he answered the issue submitted in favor of appellant,
.
saying:
3
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2. The discharge of Karma (sic) Held
on December 2, 1954, by the Company was not
in violation of Article III of the Contract between the parties. (R. 55, emphasis added).
Consequently it is clear that respondent cannot
rely here on an alleged violation of Article III of
the contract. In fact it has been stipulated that the
question of a violation of Article III is not an issue
in this case. ( R. 43 ) .
Appellant answered respondent's complaint, alleging that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and denying that respondent's
discharge was without just cause, or that it was
in violation of the collective bargaining agreement
(R. 4, 5).
The case came on for Pre-Trial Hearing before
the Honorable Martin M. Larson, District Judge,
on January 28, 1956 (R. 19) (the Pre-Trial Order
reciting February 28, 1956 is in error) at which
time appellant filed its written Motion to Dismiss
( R. 18). The Trial Court took the matter under
advisement and after considering the written memoranda and agruments of both parties the Trial
Court made and entered its written Order dated
March 6, 1956 (R. 21), wherein it denied appellant's Motion to Dismiss, holding that:
1. The M'aster Labor Agreement between the defendant and the union, even in the
4
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absence of an express provision so providing,
gives to each employee covered thereby a right
to continuing employment which cannot be
terminated by the defendant as employer except for just cause.
2. Any employee working under such
a labor agreement has the right to a jury trial
on the issue of whether or not his discharge
was for just cause. Consequently plaintiff
has a right to maintain this action. (R. 21,
22, emphasis added).
A copy of that Order is printed beginning at
page 29 of the Appendix to this brief for the convenience of the Court.

Pursuant to Rule 72 ('b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, appellant thereupon duly filed in this
Honorable Court its Petition for Interlocutory Appeal from said Order ( R. 25-29). Said petition was
granted by this Honorable Court on April 25, 1956
(R. 23).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND
ENTERING ITS ORDER DATED MARCH 6, 1956 IN
'WHICH IT: (a) HELD THAT THE MASTER LABOR
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND
THE UNION, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EX~PRESS PROVISION SO PROVIDING, GIVES TO EACH
EMPLOYEE COVERED THEREBY A RIGH'T TO CONTINUING EMPLOYMENT WHICH CANNOT BE TERMINATED BY THE APPELLANT AS EMPLOYER EXCEPT FOR JUST CAUSE; (b) HELD THAT ANY EM5
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PLOYEE WORKING UNDER SUCH A LABOR AGREEMENT HAS THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT HIS DISCHARGE WAS
FOR JUST CAUSE; (c) DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT.

ARGUMENT
Respondent has alleged that her discharge by
appellant was "without good and sufficient cause"
and was "in vio'lation of the terms and conditions
of the collective bargaining agreement" (R. 2).
Appellant strongly contends that it did have just
cause for discharging respondent. However, for purposes of this appeal, it is immaterial whether or not
such just cause actually and in fact did exist, as
will be developed in the following argument.
1.

Basic Concepts of the Employer-Employee Relation-

ship.

In a free country employment is a relationship
which depends upon mutual consent of the employer
and the employee. It may be described as a contractual relationship, terminable at will under the common law. No free man can be compelled to work for
another against his will, and an employer has the
unquestioned right to discharge or lay off employees
at will, except insofar as this right has been restricted by statute or bargained away by contract.
As the Maryland Court of Appeals has so aptly put
it:
"* * * when not bound by contract every
free man has a natural right to wo~k for
6
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whom he pleases, and to cease to work when
he chooses, without liability on his part to the
employer. To enforce the opposite view would
lead to the establishment of involuntary servitude. Every employer must recognize this
right on the part of the employees, and, if
by such action loss results, it is damnum absque injuria. The employer has the same undoubted right, when not prevented by contract,
to discharge the employees, which may, and in
many cases does, result in loss and injury to
the employee and those depen'dent upon him;
yet this loss and injury, too, must be suffered
by the employee without being able to maintain an action therefor against the employer."
Bricklayers, M. & P. Int. Union v. Ruff &
Sons, Inc. (Md. 1931) 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl.
52, 83 ALR 448, 456, (emphasis added).
The text writers have stated the rule as follows:
"In the absence of something in the contract of employment to fix a definite term of
service, or other contractual provision to restrict the right of the employer to discharge,
or some statutory restriction upon this right,
an employer may lawfully discharge an employee at what time he pleases and for what
cause he chooses without thereby becoming
liable to an action against him." (35 Am. Jur.
469, Master and Servant, Section 34, citing
numerous cases. Emphasis added).
See also 56 C.J.S. 411, Master and Servant,
Sec. 29 and cases cited therein.
This right of an employer to discharge at will
has been said to be "a constitutional right of the
7
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utmost importance". N.L.R.B. v. Citizens News Co.
(CA 9th 1943) 134 F.2'd 9'70. And another court
has said an employee "may be discharged by the employer for a good reason, a poor reason, or no reason
at all, so long as the terms of the statute are not
violated." N.L.R.B. v. Condenser Corp. ( CA 3rd
1942) 128 F. 2d 67, 10 LRRM 483.
As has been stated above, an employer's otherwise complete and absolute right to discharge without liability for so doing can be limited by statute
or by contractual provision. The typical limitation
imposed by state and federal labor laws is that an
employer may. not discharge because of lawful union
activity on the part of an employee. It should be
noted that this same limitation is also imposed upon
the appellant here by the terms of Article III of the
Master Labor Agreement (R. 44, Appendix p. 20).
However, it is stipulated in this case that there is
no question of a violation of Article III herein involved.
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Employment Contracts Distinguished.
2.

There is a basic difference between a collective
bargaining agreement and an employment contract.
The former is typically an agreement in writing between an employer and a union which sets forth
certain terms and conditions for the job classifica8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions covered thereby. Ordinarily the individual employees are not parties thereto, although they benefit
directly therefrom, and in several jurisdictions they
can directly enforce the provisions thereof, usually
under t'he theory of third party beneficiary. A collective bargaining agreement usually does not create
or specify definite tenure of employment for the
individual employees, but merely provides that in
the event employees work in the job classifications
covered by the agreement that the terms therein contained shall be applied. Generally such agreements
in effect establish minimums as to wages and other
conditions below which an employer cannot go.
On the other hand, an employment contract is
ordinarily between an employer and the individual
employee. While it may be written, it is most generally oral. It is the device by which the actual hiring
is accomplished and the employer-employee relationship is established. It is this individual employment
contract, generally which creates the job tenure, if
any in fact exists. Such individual employment contracts or hirings are of course subject to and entitled to the benefits of the collective bargaining
agreement if one exists. Mr. Justice Jackson, in
speaking for the United States Supreme Court, has
stated it in this manner:
"Contract in labor law is a term the implications of which must be determined from
9
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the connection in which it appears. Collective
bargaining between employer a!ld the repr~
sentative of a unit usually a union, results In
an accord as to te~ms which will govern hiring and work and pay in that unit. The result
is not however a contract of employment
except' in rare ca~es; no one has a job by reason
of it and no obligation to any indiviljual ordinarily comes into existence from tt alone.
The negotiations between union and management result in what often has been called
a trade agreement, rather than a contract of
employment. Without pushing the analogy too
far, the agreement may be likened to the
tariffs established by a carrier, to standard
provisions prescribed by supervising authorities for insurance policies, or to utility schedules of rates and rules for service, which do
not of themselves establish any relationships
but which do govern the terms of the shipper
or insurer or customer relationship whenever
and with whomever it may be established.

*· * * *

"After the collective trade agreement is
made, the individuals who shall benefit by it
are identified by individual hirings. The employer, except as restricted by the collective
agreement itself and except that he must engage in no unfair labor practice or discrimination, is free to select those he will employ or
discharge. But the terms of the employment
already have been traded out. There is little
l~f~ to indiyid~a.l agreement except the act of
hiring. This hiring may be by writing or by
word of mouth or may be implied from conduct. In the sense of contracts of hiring individual contracts between the employe~ and
10
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employee are not forbidden, but indeed are
necessitated by the collective bargaining procedure." J. I. Case Company v. N.L.R.B. (U.S.
Sup. Ct. 1944) 321 U.S. 332; 64 S. Ct. 576; 88
L. E'd. 762; 14 LRRM 501, 503, emphasis
added.
3. Contractual Limitations on Appellant's Right to
Discharge.
(a)

Term of Employment

The general rule is that a general or indefinite
hiring is presumed to be a hiring at will (56 C.J.S.,
Master and Servant, Section 8 (b) ) , and in the absence of express stipulations as to duration a contract of employment may be terminated at the will
of either party without cause and without liability
to the other for such termination. Culver v. Kurn
(Missouri 1946) 193 SW 602, 166 A.L.R. 644. The
rule goes even further, to the effect that even where
the employment contract, without specifying a fixed
duration, purports to be for life, or for permanent
employment, where the employee furnishes no consideration other than his services incidenta1 to the
employment, such an employment contract amounts
only to an indefinite general hiring, terminable at
the will of either party, and that a discharge without cause does not constitute a breach of such contract as will justify recovery of damages. (Annotation: 135 A.L.R. 646, citing many cases including
Price v. Western Loan & Savings Co. (Utah 1909)
11
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35 U. 379, 100 Pac. 677). In the Price case this
Honorable Court said:

"* * * As hereinbefore observed, the contract neither expressly nor impliedly, bound
him 'to act as appellant's attorney _for any
specified period of time. Therefore tt lac~ed
the essential element of mutualtty of obltgation and was terminable at will by either
party." (ibid, 100 Pac. 677, 680, emphasis
ad·ded).
We submit that a cursory examination of the
Master Labor Agreement between the appellant and
the union will show that it does not constitute an
agreement for a definite term of service. We submit
that under the general rules, supra, the employment
of the respondent was for an indefinite term and
consequently could be terminated at the will of either
appellant or respondent. She could have terminated
her employment at any time without incurring any
legal lia'bility for such termination. We submit that
the corollary of respondent's right to terminate at
any time is the right of appellant to terminate the
employment at any time, for if this were not the
case there would be no mutuality of obligation and
consequently no legally enforceable agreement for
continuing employment. Price v. Western Loan &
Savings Co., supra; Swart v. Huston (Kansas 1941)
117 P. 2d 579.
Since the Master Labor Agreement contains no
12
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provision expressing or implying employment for a
definite term the presumption is that respondent's
employment was terminable at wil1 and she must
fail in her case unless the contract otherwise restricts appellant's right to discharge.
(b)

Other Provisions of the Master Labor Agreement

Since the agreement does not provide for a definite term of employment, and since Article III of
the agreement is not herein involved, the basic issue
narrows itself to a search for some other provisions
of the agreement upon which the Trial Court's Order
may be justified. Such a search is fruitless, for of
course there are no such provisions. It should be
remem bered that the burden is on respondent to
show that the agreement gives her the right she seeks
to enforce, that is, the right to continue employment for as long as she wants it. The agreement
must affirmatively create respondent's right to continuing employment. Appellant's right to discharge
exists unimpaired unless affirmatively taken away
by the agreement.
1

A contractual provision which limits or restricts such a "constitutional right of utmost importance" (Citizens News Co. case, supra) must clearly
show that such was the intent of the parties. There
is no express provision which gives respondent the
cause of action she seeks to enforce, and we submit
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that there are no provisions from which such a limitation on appellant's right to discharge can be reasonably inferred or implied.
At the Pre-Trial hearing, respondent urged
and relied upon the seniority provisions of the agreement. Those provisions do not support respondent's
cause of action. Seniority rights arise solely by virtue of contract. They are not inherent, natural, or
constitutional rights. Colbert v. Railroad Trainmen
(CA. 9th 1953) 206 F. 2d. 9, 32 LRRM 2459; Zdero
v. Briggs Mfg. Co. (Mich. 1953) 61 NW 2d 615, 33
LRRM 2405. In this regard the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recently said:
"Collective bargaining agreements creating a seniority system do not create a permanent status or give an indefinite tenure to employees. (Citing cases). Seniority among railroad employees is contractual and does not
arise from mere employment. (Citing cases).
Those who acquire seniority rights under a
contract are bound by the possibility that the
contract may be changed, and the rights thereunder revised or abrogated. (Citing cases).
Employees have no vested right in the seniority created by contract and the Railway Labor: Act doe_s not undertake to guarantee them
a JOb for ltfe. The employer has the right to
sele9t and dis_c~arge them, so long as the collecttve bargatntng processes are not impaired." (Citing cases). M cMullans v. Kansas,
Okla., & Gulf Ry. (CA lOth 1956) 229 F.2d
50, 37 LRRM 2363, 2364.
14
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Where seniority rights do in fact exist as a result of contract they are not inconsistent with the
employer's right to discharge. (56 C.J.S. 64, citing
Fine v. Pratt (Texas) 150 S.W. 2d 308). Since they
exist by virtue of contract only, seniority rights are
only as broad as the express terms of the contract.
The only language in the agreement here relating
to seniority is as follows:
ARTICLE VIII
SENIORITY
The Company agrees in layoffs and rehiring of employees to observe the principle of
departmental seniority wherever reasonable
in the light of efficiency. The Company, however, to be the judge of qualifications in such
matters. In applying seniority, the Employer
shall take into consideration length of service, merit and ability of the employee. (R.
46, Appendix p. 23) .
Note that under the agreement seniority will
apply only in lay-offs and rehirings, and even in
those cases only when reasonable in the light of efficiency, the company to be the judge. The term
"lay-off" means a temporary or prolonged separation as a result of lack of work. ( CCH Glossary of
Labor Terms). No one contends that respondent was
merely "laid off".
Respondent argues that the above seniority
clause gives her the complete right to uninterrupted
15
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job tenure until she is guilty of conduct constituting
"just cause" for discharge. This argument does violence to the Englis'h language and to common sense
and reason.
We submit that the provisions of the agreement
individually an·d;or collectively do not constitute a
contractual limitation upon appellant's complete and
a'bsolute right to discharge. Above all, those provisions do not give to respondent "a right to continuing employment which cannot be terminated except
for just cause" as the Trial Court held in its Order.
The ruling of the Trial Court in effect adds an express restriction against discharge to every collective bargaining agreement by judicial fiat. It grants
to each employee covered by such an agreement a
substantial property right, permanent job tenure,
all without the agreement or consent of the contracting parties. The ruling overturns the historical and
heretofore unquestioned rights of employers which
have a'lways existed. It is extremely doubtful that
such a rule would be constitutional if established
by the legislature. For it to be established by the
District Court is unthinkable.
4.

The Russell Case.

At the Pre-Trial respondent's counsel cited the
Utah case of Russell v. Ogden Union Ry and Depot
Co., (Utah 1952)
Utah
, 247 P. 2d 257, as
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being a Utah case supporting respondent's position.
A cursory reading of it shows that contrary to the
impression that counsel tried to create the Russell
case does not support respondent's contention.
In the Russell case, Russell sued his employer
for an alleged arbitrary and wrongful discharge,
and recovered substantial damages in the trial court.
This Honorable Court reversed the judgment for
plaintiff and remanded the case for a new trial. The
contract of employment relied on by Russell provided that:

''* * * No yardman will be suspended or
dismissed without first having a fair and impartial hearing and his guilt established.
* * *" (Emphasis ad.ded).
The case was reversed for certain errors in refusing to allow the employer to present evidence at
the trial, and for errors with regard to damages.
Counsel for tile respondent would equate the
purposes clause and the seniority clause of appellant's agreement with the provision in the Russell
case contract quoted above. To argue that this may
be done is to ignore the plain meaning of the words
used and to ignore all common sense and judgment.
It would be difficult to conceive or draft a stronger
or more complete limitation on an employer's right
to discharge than is quoted in the Russell case. Under
such a provision an employer must hold a hearing
17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and the guilt of the employee must be established
before he can be discharged. The majority opinion
in the Russell case says that where such a provision
existed the employee established a prima facie case
by proving such a contract, his performance thereof up to the time of his discharge, and damages.
Then the burden falls upon the employer to prove
justification for the discharge. But this rule as enunciated by the court is expressly limited to cases
where the contract has such a limitation on the right
to discharge as was therein involved.
-

There is no such clause in the instant case. The
Russell case does not aid the respondent, nor justify
the Trial Court's Order.
CONCLUSION
1. At common law respondent has no cause
of action, since appellant may discharge with or
without cause and incur absolutely no liability therefor. Tlhis right to discharge remains complete and
unabridged except insofar as it may be limited by
statute or bargained away by contract.
2. Since no question of statutory limitation is
involved, respondent must rely on breach of contract,
which she has alleged. But the Master Labor Agreement herein neither grants to respondent job tenure
for a definite or continuing period nor directly or
indirectly limits or restricts appellant's right to dis18
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charge. Consequently respondent's employment is
terminab'le at will and there can be no liability on appellant for discharging her.
3. The Trial Court erred as a matter of law
when it held that the Master Labor Agreement gave
to respondent a right to continuing employment
which could not be taken away except for just cause.
Its Order constitutes highly improper judicial legislation.
The Order of the Trial Court should be reversed
and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss
the complaint with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted
LOUIS H. CALLISTER and
NATHAN J. FULLMER
619 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
PETER W. BILLING'S
802 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Counsel for Respondent
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APPENDIX
MASTER
AGREEMENT
THIS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, made and entered into this Ninth day of
September, 1948, by and 'between the AMERICAN
LINEN SUPPLY CO., Salt Lake City, Utah located
at 35 East Sixth South, hereinafter referred to as
the "Company", and the AMALGAMATED
CLOTHING WORKERS LOCAL UNION #562,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union"; WITNESSETH THAT: The parties hereto mutually agree
as follows:
ARTICLE I
OBJECTS
The objects of this agreement, and the aims and
intentions which the parties are desirous of attain.
1ng are:
(a) To effectuate a spirit of fair dealings
'between employer and employee.
(b) To bring about and esta'blish a high order
of discipline and efficiency by the intelligent cooperation of employer and employee.
(c) To provide for adjustment of all matters
subject to arbitration by proceedure hereinafter set
forth.
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(d) To increase the standards of workmanship and conduct so as to insure a fair and proper
quantity, quality and cost of production.
(e) To raise the standards of the linen supply
industry in the City of Salt Lake and vicinity so
that it may command the respect and increased
patronage of the public.
ARTICLE II
NO SITRIKE
It is agreed that strikes, lockouts and sympathy
strikes and stoppage of work are prohibited, subject
to arbitration under Article X hereof.
AR·TICLE III
DISCRIMINATION
The Company agrees not to suspend, discipline,
discharge or discriminate against any employee for
lawful union activities.
AR:TICLE IV
UNIT
The term "employees" as used in this agreement shall include: All employees of the American
Linen Supply Co. at 3'5 East Sixth South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, employed in the sewing department,
soil sorting department, washing department, iron::.
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ing department, bundling department, shipping department, cafeteria! department, shop department,
garage department, and janitors, excluding supervisory employees with the power to hire or fire or
to effectively recommend such hiring or firing, such
as superintendent, floor walker, floor lady, chief engineer, washroom foreman, soil counter foreman,
floor lady in the sewing department, head engineer,
watchman, all office employees, all truck drivers
and driver salesmen.
ARTICLE V
RECOGNITION
The Company hereby recognizes the Union as
the collective bargaining agent as provided for by
law with respect to the employees described in Article IV, the appropriate unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining, with respect to wages and
other working conditions.
ARTICLE VI
UNION SECURITY
All present employees covered by this contract
shall become members of the Union not later than
thirty (30) days following its effective date and
shall remain members as a condition precedent to
continued employment. This section shall apply to
newly hired employees thirty (30) days from the
date of their employment with the Company.
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The foregoing section sha'll become effective
after certification by the National Labor Relations
Board issued in accordance with Section 8 (a-3-e)
of the National Labor Relations Act as amended.
ARTICLE VII
CHECK-OFF .
The Company agrees during the term of this
agreement to accept written assignments from employees, executed and delivered in conformance with
Section 49-14-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, and the
Labor Management Act of 1947 as amended.
AR'TICLE VIII
SENIORITY
The Company agrees in lay-offs and rehiring of
employees to observe the principle of departmental
seniority wherever reasonable in the light of efficiency. The Company, however, to lbe the judge of
qualifications in such matters. In applying seniority,
the Employer shall take into consideration length
of service, merit and ability of the emp'loyee.
AR TICLE IX
1

TRANSFER TO LOWER JOB CLASSIFICATION
If the Company temporarily transfers an employee to a lower job classification, because of emergency, the employee will not suffer a reduction in
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his wage rate until such time as the Employer shall
notify the Union or the employee that the transfer
is perm anent.
ARTICLE X
ARBITRATION
All controversies as to the interpretation and
application of this Master agreement that cannot
be settled by the representative of the Employer and
the Union, within the period of one week from the
date that the grievance is cal'led to the attention of
the other party in writing, shall submit the matter
for decision to a Board of Arbitration to be constituted as hereinafter set forth:
(a) The Employer and the Union shall each
select an arbitrator within forty-eight
( 48) hours, and the two thus chosen shall
select a third impartial arbitrator. In the
event that the two so chosen are unable to
agree upon a third member within fortyeight hours, then it is understood and
agreed that the rna tter in controversy shall
then be immediately submitted to the American Arbitration Association for settlement by appointment of an arbitrator and
a hearing fn accordance with the procedure
of said Association.
('b) Any and all decisions made in accordance
with the procedure hereof set forth shall be
bin_ding upon. parties to this agreement.
Failure to abide by such decisions shall be
considered a breach of this agreement and
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the Union or Employer shall be free to
enforce such decision by such action as it
seems appropriate, anything under Article
II to the contrary notwithstanding.
The parties hereto agree that the expenses and
fee of the third member or the American Arbitration Association shall be borne equally.
ARTICLE XI
ACCESS TO PLANT TO INVESIGATE
GRIEVANCES
A representative of the Union shall have access
to the plant for the purpose of investigating grievances or disputes. However, he must first receive
permission from the plant manager or his representative.
ARTICLE XII
SHOP STEWARD
The Company agrees to recognize a shop steward for the upstairs division and one for the downstairs division. These two stewards, together with
the President of the Union, shall constitute the
grievance committee.
ARTICLE XIII
LEAVE OF ABSENCE
Leave of absence may be granted, without pay,
for personal reasons for a period not to exceed thirty
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(30) days upon written application of the employee
and the approval of the Company. Any leave of absence extending· over thirty ( 30) days shall be in
writing and m'ay be extended for an indefinite
length of time upon agreement between the Company and the employee, with the approval of the
Union.
Employees selected to a Union position by the
Union to do work which takes him from his employment with the company, shall, upon written request
of the Union, receive temporary leave of absence
for the period of his service with the Union for the
duration of this agreement, and upon his return shall
be re-employed at work in line with his seniority
status in the classification in which he was engaged
last prior to his leave of absence.
ARTICLE XIV
UNIFORMS
All uniforms and protective clothing now furnished by the Co·mpany shall be continued and maintained for the life of this agreement. There shall be
no change in medical or insurance plans.
ARTICLE XV
MA'TERNITY LEAVE
It is agreed that any female employee requesting leave of absence in maternity cases shall be
granted such leave without loss of seniority.
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ARTICLE XVI
TERMINA:TION
This Master Agreement shall remain in force
and effect from date hereof, to and including the
8th day of September, 1957. On or before sixty (60)
days prior to the expiration date of this Master
Agreement, either party may give written notice of
its desire to change, modify or terminate this Master Agreement or any portion thereof. In the event
that either party or both desire to modify or change
the same, then and in that event the parties shall
meet immediately after receiving such notification,
for the purpose of discussing such changes or modifications. In the event of the failure of the parties
to agree as to any such proposed changes or modifications, either of the parties to this agreement may
at any time during such negotiations express its
desire to have the matters submitted to arbitration
as provided for in Article X. In the event that such
notice is given by either party, the matters then in
dispute at the time of receiving such notice shall
be submitted to arbitration as provided for herein.
The parties agree that during such arbitration
or negotiations, there shall be no lock-out, strikes,
slow downs or work stoppages.
It is further understood and agreed that in the
event that it shall be determined by the National
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Labor Relations Board or a Federal Court of competent jurisdiction, that the period of time agreed
to for the duration of this contract is an unreasonable length of time, then and in that event it is understood and agreed that this contract shall continue
in force and effect for what such agency or court
determines to be a reasonable length of time.
IN WTTNESS WHEREOF, the parties have
affixed the signatures of their authorized representaives this 14th day of Sept., 1948.
AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY CO.
(SAUT LAKE CITY, UTAH)
BY /s/ F. G. Steiner, Pres.
/s/ 0. A. Knapp, Sec'y
AMALGAMATED CLOTHING
WORKERS LOCAL UNION
#562
BY /s/ Arthur J. Christensen,
Pres.
/s/ Henrietta June Davis,
Sec.

Is/ Frank Bonacci
CIO Regional Director
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In the
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
in and for Salt Lake County
STATE OF UTAH
KARNA HELD,
Plaintiff,

vs.
AMERICAN LINEN SUPPLY
CO., a corporation,
Defendant.

ORDER
Civil No.
105216

This matter came on regularly for pre-trial
hearing on Saturday, January 28, 1956 before the
Honorable Martin M. Larson, one of the Judges of
the above entitle'd Court. Plaintiff was represented
by her counsel, Dwight L. King, and defendant being
represented by its counsel, Peter W. Billings, Louis
H. Callister, and Nathan J. Fullmer. Defendant
filed its written motion to dismiss alleging that the
pleadings, together with plaintiff's answer to defendant's interrogatories and defendant's requests
for admissions, showed that plaintiff did not have
a claim against defen·dant upon which relief can be
granted.
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The Court heard the arguments of counsel, received written briefs of counsel for both sides, and
reviewed a copy of the Master Labor Agreement between the defendant and a labor union, which copy
was furnished by the parties, under which plaintiff's
rights must be determined. For the purpose of ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss the legal issue
which must be determined by the Court is whether
or not the Master Labor Agreement prohibits the
defendant from discharging its employees without
just cause.
The Court, having considered the provisions of
the contract as well as the arguments and briefs of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises now
rules as follows :
1. The Master Labor Agreement between the
defendant and the union, even in the absence of an
express provision so providing, gives to each employee covered thereby, a right to continuing employment which cannot be terminated by the defendant
as employer except for just cause.
Any employee working under such a labor
agreement has the right to a jury trial on the issue
of whether or not his discharge was for just cause.
Consequently plaintiff has a right to maintain this
action.
2.
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3. Defendant's motion to dismiss is, accordingly, denied.
4. This case is set for jury trial on Friday,
April13, 1956.
Dated this 6th day of March, 1956.
/s/

MAR:TIN M. LARSON

JUDGE
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